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When the use of motor vehicles for pleasure as well as business
became widespread, the demand arose for an effective method of sub-
jecting the owner of a motor vehicle to the judicial power of a state in
which he was a non-resident, but in which his operation of the vehicle
had caused injury to the body or property of another. All too often, by
the time the injured person was able to start suit the non-resident
motorist had left the state. The injured person wished to sue in the
state in which he had been damaged and in which he might be a resi-
dent.' In that state, however, the injuring motorist was not present to
be served with process; nor would he voluntarily appear in any action
instituted against him there. What has happened?
The state of injury, State X, to prevent similar cases of hardship
from arising in the future, enacts a statute. The statute provides that
a non-resident of the state who operates a motor vehicle on its high-
ways is deemed to appoint some official of State X as his agent for
the service of process in any action brought in a State X court by a
plaintiff claiming injury by reason of the non-resident's operation of
the vehicle on the highways in State X and seeking compensation
therefor.2 In support of the statute it may be said that the non-resident
of State X by operating a motor vehicle on a highway of that state
assents in advance to that state's exercise of judicial power over him
to the limited extent just indicated.' It appears to even a moderately
skeptical mind that the argument assumes as true that which is not.
The legislation, nevertheless, is valid, provided the statute requires a
method of notification to the non-resident of the institution of action
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1. Unless otherwise indicated, in this article "resident" is synonymous with
"domiciliary" and "residence" with "domicile."
2. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 95Y, § 23 (1950); IND. ANN. STAT. tit. 8, § 47-
1043 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1951).
3. Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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that is considered to meet the requirements of due process.4 A non
sequitur in reasoning reaches a desired-and possibly a desirable-
conclusion.
There are drawbacks in this mode of the development of the law.
A court may fail to realize that the extension of a commonly-held or
long-accepted concept or theory to a new field of application is only
plausible, and therefore feel unable to countenance an additional and
desirable development in the law because it accepts at face value the
plausible rationalization employed to justify the earlier advance.
It is reasonable that D, a resident of State F, who so operates his
automobile on the highways of State X as to injure the person or prop-
erty of a plaintiff should be held to answer to him in a State X court
even though D may have left State X before the plaintiff could institute
judicial action. Of course D should be given the best possible notice
of the institution of any action by the plaintiff. But why seek to justify
the exercise of State X's judicial power by resort to an unsound and
untrue theory of assent thereto by D?
What may happen if a court of State X does do so? Suppose that
D dies before plaintiff brings any suit. May A, D's lawfully appointed
domiciliary (State F) personal representative,' be made a party de-
fendant in an action in State X by substituted service similar to that
which could have been had on D in his lifetime under the State X Non-
Resident Motorist Statute? Several legislatures have so enacted.' If,
however, the State X court accepts at face value, as in accord with the
realities of life, the theory that D had by use of State X highways for
the operation of his motor vehicle assented to the appointment of the
designated official of State X as his agent for the receipt of service of
process, the court may hold that D's death terminated the agency, and
that A cannot be brought before the court in State X by a mode of
service that would have sufficed to subject D in his lifetime to the
judicial power of State X.
7
It is even more likely that this conclusion will be reached if the
court in State X adheres to the theory that a personal representative
of D lawfully appointed in State F, the state in which D was domiciled
4. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
5. Unless otherwise indicated, in this article a "personal representative" may
be either an administrator or executor. However the legal relations of an ad-
ministrator may be distinguished from those of an executor, there is no material
difference between the two for the purposes of our discussion. See RESTTEEN'r,
CoNFLicr OF LAws, Introductory Note at 559, 560 (1934) and Note, 36 IowA L.
REv. 668, 672-674 (1951).
6. E.g.; N.Y. VEnic.E & TxtnrAtc LAW, § 52.
7. See cases cited in Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 847 et seq. (N.D.
Iowa 1947). Contra: Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1952); Oviatt v.
Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943); Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660,
42 N.W.2d 777 (1950); Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
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at death, is immune from suit outgide the state of his appointment. A is
appointed personal representative in State F to do certain tasks: to
collect assets that belonged to D and that are within the competency
of State F to administer, to pay off claims proved against the assets,
and ultimately to distribute the balance that may remain among those
entitled under the law of State F.8 It may well be that in many cases
State X should refuse to allow action against one who has been ap-
pointed personal representative in State F; for if it were to allow sucfi
actions, State X would fail to pay due regard to the superior interest
of State F as the state of administration.
But may there not be instances where State F should be forced to
recognize that State X has an interest superior to any of its own-an
interest so superior that State F will be forced to give recognition to a
judgment of a State X court against A, as D's personal representative,
by accepting such judgment as a claim against assets of D's estate in
State F? May not such recognition by State F of the State X judg-
ment be compelled under the full faith and credit clause? ' May there
not be cases where a personal representative of D, lawfully appointed
in State F, should be brought before the court in State X through sub-
stituted service on some state official of X? It is the purpose of this
article to show that these questions can and should reasonably be an-
swered in the affirmative.
II. THRE APPLICABILITY OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES
DEALING WITH TORT LIABILITY
Congress has recently decreed that acts of the legislature of a state,
when duly authenticated, "shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Posses-
sions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State .
from which they are taken." 'o At long last public acts have been put
on the same footing as court judgments so far as the wording of federal
legislation implementing the full faith and credit clause is concerned.
Of course, the question whether a judgment-even though valid
within the state of rendition-is entitled to external recognition in a
sister state under the full faith and credit clause, as an adjudication of
a right-duty relation, is one for the Supreme Court to answer."1 Like-
8. See REsTAm ExET, Comic- r oF LAWS, Introductory Note at 559 et seq.
(1934).
9. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1950).
11. See statements of Mr. Chief Justice Stone in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943).
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wise, whether a statute of a state is to be given external recognition in
courts of sister states must be a matter for that Court to decide.'
It would be a work of supererogation to argue that the application
of the full faith and credit clause to state statutes must be more flexible
than the application of the clause to state court judgments.
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its
own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right,
because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state
by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing,
upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved
those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It
follows that not every statute of another state will override a con-
flicting statute of the forum by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause; that the statute of a state may sometimes override the
conflicting statute of another, both at home and abroad; and, again,
that the two conflicting statutes may each prevail over the other
at home, although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of
the other." '3
In other words, the public policy of one state as expressed in its statute
may conflict with the public policy of a sister state as set forth in its
legislation. Then the Supreme Court must act as arbitrator by making
a selection between the competing public policies involved.' 4 The
demand for the rendition of full faith and credit to a state statute may,
however, present a somewhat different problem. The question posed
to the Supreme Court may be: should the policy of one state, whether
or not expressed in statutory form, yield to a national or federal policy
that favors recognition and enforcement throughout the United States,
its territories and possessions, of right-duty relations arising under the
statute of any one of the other states? "0
Under the full faith and credit clause, a state may be compelled
ito recognize a right of action in a plaintiff because of a statute of a
sister state. Almost twenty years ago a defendant in an action in the
United States District Court in New Hampshire defeated a plaintiff
administratrix who sought recovery under a New Hampshire statute
for the negligent killing in that state of her intestate.' Defendant
succeeded by convincing the Supreme Court that full faith and credit
was due in New Hampshire to a provision in the Vermont Work-
men's Compensation Act purporting to make the remedy provided by
12. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951).
13. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S. 532, 547-548
(1935).
14. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-612 (1951).
15. Ibid.
16. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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that statute "exclusive': of any other remedy.17  At that time the
Supreme Court might have been hesitant to rule that full faith and
credit required a state to recognize a tort right of action in a plaintiff
created under the statute of a sister state."8 Recently, however, the
Court decided Hughes v. Fetter."9 The legislation of Wisconsin
allowed actions in its courts for the recovery of compensation for the
wrongful killing of a deceased only when the act causing death oc-
curred in Wisconsin." Accordingly, a plaintiff administrator had
not been allowed to prosecute an action for the alleged wrongful killing
of his intestate in Illinois.2 The Supreme Court, however, held on
appeal that Wisconsin could not refuse access to its courts for enforce-
ment of the cause of action under the wrongful death act of Illinois,22
saying that "Wisconsin's statutory policy which excludes this Illinois
cause of action is forbidden by the national policy of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause." '
There is no need here to discuss the significance of the decision
and the reasoning in the opinions of the majority of the Court and of
the four dissenting justices. 4 It may be conceded that not every
statute creating tort liability will be entitled to external recognition
under the full faith and credit clause, but it is material to consider
whether, and to what extent, a statute providing for survival of tort
liability is entitled to be so recognized.
III. THE APPLICATION OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES
PROVIDING FOR SURVIVAL OF TORT LIABILITY
It is not contended that a statute of survival always merits full
faith and credit. For example, suppose that D, a resident of State F,
makes statements while he is present in State X which, under the
circumstances, constitute under the law of State X a cause of action
in defamation in favor of P and that D dies before P sues. Suppose,
further, that a statute of State X permits causes of action in tort for
defamation to survive. Should State F be held under a duty to give
17. VT. GEN. LAWS §5774 (1917), now VT. REV. STAT. §8076 (1947).
18. Compare language of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bradford Electric Light Co.
v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932), s.,ith language of Mr. Justice Stone in the same
case, id. at 163.
19. 341 U.S. 609 (1951). See also First Natil. Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
342 U.S. 396 (1952).
20. Wis. STAT. § 331.03 (1949).
21. Hughes v. Fetter, 257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
22. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 70, § 2 (1936), now ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 70, § 2 (Supp.
1951).
23. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).
24. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Jackson, Mr. Justice Minton and Mr. Justice Reed joined.
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full faith and credit to that statute of State X by allowing a right of
action in favor of P against the personal representative of D lawfully
appointed in State F? There may be good reason for giving a nega-
tive answer. With the possible exception of radio broadcasters, it is
not unreasonable to believe that a person is far less apt to commit the
tort of defamation away from the state of his residence than he is
to injure, away from the state of his residence, the body or property
of another by negligent operation of a motor vehicle.'s It is even
more reasonable to believe that a person is less apt to die outside of
the state of his residence as a consequence of his defamatory utter-
ances than he is to die as a consequence of his negligent operation of a
motor vehicle in a state other than the state of his residence. On the
other hand, each of the forty-eight states has a strong governmental
interest in securing reparation to persons injured within its borders
by the negligent driving of non-resident motorists. The harmonious
working of our federal system requires the adequate implementation of
such state interest.' Accordingly, it is reasonable to contend that
considerations of national policy justify the extension of full faith and
credit to statutes of survival so far as they apply to actions in tort for
personal injuries caused by automobile accidents.
Case 1. P, while driving his automobile on the public highways
of State X, was injured in a collision with a car driven by D, a resident
of State F. D was at fault; P exercised due care. Before P sues, D
dies possessed of an estate within the competency of State F to ad-
minister. A is duly appointed D's personal representative in State F,
which has a statute permitting actions in tort for injuries to the
person to survive the death of a tort-feasor. State X has no such
statute. In that state in "local" or "domestic" cases the courts hold
that liability in tort does not survive the death of a wrongdoer. May
P sue A in a court of State F?
In a leading case Chase claimed to have been injured by the
negligent operation of an elevator in a New York building owned by
Ormsby, a resident of Pennsylvania. Chase might have recovered a
judgment against Ormsby in his lifetime if she had sued him in New
York or in Pennsylvania. She brought no action against him in his
lifetime, but after his death brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Ormsby's ex-
ecutor, relying upon a Pennsylvania statute making an executor liable
25. See statement of Mr. Justice Butler in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356
(1927).
26. See statement of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253,
259 et seq. (1933).
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to suit in any action which might have been brought against the de-
ceased during life.27 In New York, seemingly, she could not, after
Ormsby's death, have maintained action against his personal repre-
sentative, even though the latter had been duly appointed and qualified
under the law of New York. The court entered a compulsory non-
suit against Chase." The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
awarded a venire facias de novo.29 The Supreme Court of the United
States, on certiorari, reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals.3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had already held that the
Pennsylvania statute permitting actions in tort to survive against the
personal representative of a wrongdoer did not apply to actions for
personal injuries sustained outside of Pennsylvania. In Sumner v.
Brown"- two residents of Pennsylvania had been partners. One of
them in the course of firm business drove an automobile in New York,
so recklessly as to kill himself and to injure the plaintiff, his guest.
The surviving partner, Arthur, later died. Still later the plaintiff
brought action against the executrix of Arthur in trespass for personal
injuries. Judgment for the defendant executrix on the pleadings was
affirmed because the plaintiff had failed to allege in his statement of
claim that the law of New York provided for survivability, against the
estate of a decedent, of liability for a common law cause of action. The
court said: "Unless the law of New York provided a right of action for
the tort, none exists; without a right of action, the suit must fail; if a
Hght exists, it must be pleaded .... ," 2
The Federal Rules of Decision Act " requires federal courts in
Pennsylvania in cases within the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
to enforce applicable statutes of Pennsylvania as interpreted and con-
strued by the highest court of the Commonwealth, provided, of course,
such statutes violate no part of the Constitution of the United States.
In the light of this Act and of Sumner v. Brown, it is difficult to see
how in the Chase case the Supreme Court could have done otherwise
than reverse the Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinion of the Circuit
Court of Appeals did not mention Sumner v. Brown, but Mr. Justice
Butler, who delivered the majority opinion for the Supreme Court,
was aware of it.84
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §772 (Purdon 1930), repeated, P.L. 512, § 1401
(1949).
28. Chase v. Ormsby, 3 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1931).
29. Chase v. Ormsby, 65 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1933).
30. Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933).
31. 312 Pa. 124, 167 AtI. 315 (1933).
32. 312 Pa. 124, 127, 167 At. 315, 316 (1933).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
34. He cited the case in his opinion.
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The Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have been of the opinion
that no state had a stronger interest than Pennsylvania in deciding
what disposal should be made of Ormsby's assets within its jurisdic-
tion to administer. According to that court, survivability of a cause
of action in tort for negligence was to be determined by the court of
the domicile at death of the tort-feasor without regard to the law of
the state in which the negligent conduct inflicted injury:
"State legislatures have absolute dominion over the property
or estate of dead men and determine what causes of action survive
and what abate with their death. Whether or not a cause of
action survives is, therefore, determined by laws of the state
where the action is brought and not by the laws of the state in
which the injury is inflicted." 3'
Mr. Justice Butler does not refer to this statement of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, but he certainly does not agree with it. According to him,
"the law of the place of the wrong determines whether the claim for
damages survives the death of the wrongdoer." " And "the place of
wrong" was the state in which Chase suffered injury.
In our hypothetical case, then, Ormsby v. Chase would not allow
P to recover in an action in State F against A as D's administrator.
Case 2. Suppose the facts to be as in case 1, with this difference:
State X has the survival statute, but State F adheres to the common-
law rule. May P maintain an action in State F against A as D's
personal representative?
Quite properly the Court in Ormsby v. Chase gives no indication
as to what the arswer would be. Since that case, however, there have
been decisions in the lower federal courts that deny P a right of action
unless the law of the state in which P receives his injury and the law
of the state in which he sues D's personal representative permit a
cause of action in tort for personal injuries to survive.17  More ac-
curately, these cases deny P a right of action unless the state in which
he is injured would permit him to maintain an action there against a
personal representative there appointed and also the state in which he
sues permits a cause of action in tort for personal injuries inflicted in
that state to survive against a locally-appointed personal representative
of the deceased tort-feasor. On the authority of Ormsby v. Chase,
35. 65 F.2d 521, 522 (1933).
36. 290 U.S. 387, 388 (1933).
37. Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1940); Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d
261 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Wash. 1940);
Dougherty v. Gutenstein, 10 F. Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
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these courts have held that if the cause of action abates in State X
because of the death of the alleged tort-feasor, it must abate elsewhere,
but even if it does not abate in State X, State F need not permit suit
on the foreign cause of action against its locally-appointed personal
representative. The American Law Institute is in accord,3 as is some
state authority3 9
A plausible argument can be made in support of these cases.
Suppose State X does have a survival statute. A judgment recovered
there against a locally-appointed personal representative of the deceased
tort-feasor is not one that binds such representative to pay out of his
own assets. It is not a judgment in personam in substance, but only
a judgment that evidences a claim against assets of the decedent which
are within the competency of State X for purposes of administration.
State X, so the argument may run, lacks power to establish by its
legislation claims against assets that are within the competency of
State F to administer. It may be, the argument further runs, that if
the cause of action of the injured person is abated in State X by the
death of the wrongdoer, it is abated elsewhere; but if it is not so abated
in State X, the cause of action will not be recognized in State F against
State F assets unless State F has by statute adopted a policy similar
to that of State X-unless State F has a statute permitting claims for
damages suffered in State F to survive against the deceased wrong-
doer's personal representative, appointed in State F.
The argument is vulnerable. Most lawyers are familiar with the
statement that descent of land or an immovable is regulated by the law
of the location,' and with the statement that, generally speaking, dis-
tribution of movables is regulated by the law of the decedent's last
domicil. 41 It is also said frequently that descent and distribution of
the assets of a decedent are not matters of federal regulation. What
is meant, of course, is that the descent and distribution of the net assets
of a decedent are not matters of federal regulation. Whether or not a
claim is to be recognized and enforced as a valid charge against gross
assets may not be a matter to be regulated by state law alone. State
power in the administration of the assets of a deceased is subject to
certain limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States.
Priority of claims against the assets of D is not wholly a matter
of state law. A debt due the United States may be subject to the
priority of an earlier valid and specific lien on D's assets that was
38. RESTATEMEXT, CoNm.tcT OF LAws, § 390, comment b (1934).
39. E.g., Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 597 (1934).
40. RESATMENT, Co~Nmcr oF LAws, §§ 245, 249 (1934).
41. Id. §§ 303, 306.
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perfected before the debt to the United States accrued.' Priority for
a debt due the United States may also be subordinated to the reason-
able costs of administration," funeral expenses," and a widow's or
child's award.45 In general, however, priority for debts due the
United States is secured by federal statute.4e
If priority of debts is not wholly a matter of state law, may the
establishment of claims against assets within the competency of State
F to administer be a matter not wholly for the law of that state to de-
cide? For example, suppose a valid money judgment is recovered in
State X against a defendant, and an action in State F is brought by
the judgment creditor on the judgment against the judgment debtor.
The court in State F probably would be under a duty, by virtue of the
full faith and credit clause, to give effect to that judgment as an ad-
judication of a right-duty relation between the judgment creditor and
the debtor.4 7  The court in State F could not refuse to do so merely
because it could have refused to allow suit on the original cause of
action for reasons of its own local public policy.48 Suppose that no
action is brought in the lifetime of the judgment debtor on the judg-
ment recovered in State X, but the judgment remains unsatisfied at
the time of the latter's death and is still enforcible, i.e., action thereon
is not barred by any statute of limitations of either State X or State F.
In proceedings in the court in State F in which assets of the deceased
judgment debtor are being administered, the judgment would have to
be given recognition as an adjudication of a right-duty relation between
the judgment creditor and the debtor. Again, the court in State F
could not refuse to grant such recognition on the ground that, for
reasons of its own local public policy, it could have refused to allow suit
on the original cause of action. The full faith and credit clause
forbids such a refusal.
49
To summarize, in our hypothetical case 2 the conduct of D while
he was present in person in State X might have been the basis of a
judgment against him in State X in his life. Had such a judgment
42. See statements in United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F2d 533, 536
et seq. (8th Cir. 1929), aff'd, 280 U.S. 478 (1929).
43. See statement in case of Jessie Smith, 24 B.T.A. 807, 811 (1931).
44. See statement in Postmaster Gen. v. Robbins, 19 Fed. Cas. 1126 (D. Me.
1829), cited in G.C.M. 4217, VII-2 Cum. Bull. 162 (1928) and in S.M. 5032, V-1
Cum. Bull. 109 (1926).
45. Jessie Smith, 24 B.T.A. 807 (1931). See also I.T. 2712, XII-2 Cune. Bull.
138 (1933) ; but cf. May R. Kieferdorf, 1 T.C. 772 (1943).
46. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1948).
47. See statement of Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287, 294-5 (1942).
48. Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
49. Rights of priority in payment, of course, are another matter.
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remained unsatisfied at his death, and had action thereon not been
barred by any statute of limitations of State F, in an action by P
against the administrator of D appointed in State F, the court of State
F would be compelled by full faith and credit to recognize the judg-
ment as an adjudication of a right-duty relation between P and D as
a basis for a claim against the assets of D which were being adminis-
tered in State F. Assume that no action in case 2 is brought in State
X against D in his lifetime. State F could develop its conflict of laws
rules in such manner as to lead its courts to recognize the survival
statute of State X as a basis for allowing a claim against the assets of
D in State F.50 Full faith and credit should require it to do so. Such
compulsion would not interfere with State F's peculiar governmental
interest in regulating descent and distribution of D's assets.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER THE FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF A NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST
If in case 2 a court in State F is under a duty to grant, to the
extent just indicated, full faith and credit to the survival statute of
State X, the question will next arise whether the personal representa-
tive of D lawfully appointed in State F may be successfully sued in
State X.
Case 3. D, a resident of State F, by negligent driving of his car
in State X, injures P. D dies before P brings action. A is appointed
personal representative in State F. State X has a statute permitting
causes of action for personal injuries to survive the death of a tort-
feasor. It also has a statute providing that its courts shall have juris-
diction of an action against the personal representative of a non-
resident motorist for the recovery of compensation for personal in-
juries caused by the non-resident's negligent operation of a motor
vehicle in State X." The statute is purportedly drawn on the theory
that a non-resident motorist by his use of the public highways of
State X consents irrevocably to appoint some official of State X as
his agent for the receipt of service of process in any action in a court
of State X to recover damages for injuries caused by the non-resident
motorist's negligent driving on the public highways of State X. Fur-
ther, the statute is drawn on the theory that a non-resident undertakes
50. See Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314, rev'd on other
grounds, 234 N.W. 868 (1931). See also: In re Daniel's Estate, 208 Minn. 420,
294 N.W. 465 (1940); Kertson v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 242 N.W. 329 (1932);
Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W.2d 96 (1933) semble; Parsons v. American
Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698 (1934); 21 Tenn. App. 202,
108 S.W.2d 187 (1937).
51. E.g., N.Y. VEHIcL & TRAic LAw § 52.
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to subject not only himself but his personal representative to the juris-
diction of the courts of State X.
First, suppose A is actually served with process in State X and
judgment is entered against him there. It seems that full faith and
credit will compel the courts of State F to give effect to such judgment
as a claim against D's assets subject to administration in State F.
In Knoop v. Anderson " the court thought that an administrator
appointed in State F could be sued in State X only if there were assets
of D in State X; that a judgment against A as administrator appointed
in State F could not be a judgment in personam against him; that the
most the courts of State X could do would be to enter a judgment
against A which would in substance be an adjudication of a claim to
be satisfied out of the assets of D in State X; that State X courts could
not establish a claim against assets of D unless the assets were within
the competency of State X to administer.
Granted, it would violate due process for State X to enter a judg-
ment against the State F administrator which would undertake to bind
him in personam. There is no need to discuss the power of State X
by means of an action against the State F administrator to establish
a claim against assets of the deceased in State X. Normally an ad-
ministrator would be appointed in State X to administer assets there,
but there would seem to be no reason why State X should not treat
one appointed administrator in State F as if he also had been appointed
administrator in State X."
The critical question is whether State X can by action brought
against the State F administrator on personal service in State X
adjudicate in favor of the plaintiff a claim to share in State F assets.
Is State F under full faith and credit obliged to give recognition to
such adjudication?
Morris v. Jones ' may afford help by furnishing an analogy.
Chicago Lloyds was an association 0 authorized to carry on an insur-
ance business in Illinois and elsewhere. It obtained a license to con-
duct business in Missouri, where Morris brought an action in tort
against it. During the pendency of the suit the Illinois Director of
Insurance was appointed by an Illinois court to take possession of the
assets of the association and to liquidate it. The Illinois court fixed
52. 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
53. E.g., cf. Iu.. RZv. STAT. c. 3, §416 (1951).
54. 329 U.S. 545 (1947).
55. Although Chicago Lloyds was described in different terms by the majority
and by the dissenters, it is clear that the concern comprised a group of persons who
enjoyed special privileges under the Illinois Insurance Code of 1937, IL. LAWS 1937,
pp. 696 et seq. Pertinent sections are now found in ILl REv. STAT. c. 73, § 698
et seq. (1951).
1952] NON-RESIDENT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES 235
a day for filing of claims and ordered all suits pending against the
association stayed. Counsel for the association in Morris' Missouri
suit thereupon withdrew from the case, and the Missouri court was
advised of the appointment of the Illinois liquidator and the conse-
quent vesting of title in him to all the assets of Chicago Lloyds.5" The
Missouri court, however, allowed Morris to recover a judgment against
Chicago Lloyds for $50,000. He then presented the judgment as a
claim in the liquidation proceedings in Illinois. The Illinois liquidator
refused to recognize the judgment as a claim, and the Supreme Court
of Illinois upheld his action.5 7  The Supreme Court of the United
States held that under the full faith and credit clause the Missouri
judgment was entitled to recognition in the Illinois liquidation pro-
ceedings as a claim against assets. The Missouri judgment did not
purport to divest the association of its legal relations with reference
to any specific part of its assets.5" The Illinois official liquidator was
vested with title to assets in Illinois of the association. 59 He was under
a duty to use such assets in payment of claims against Chicago Lloyds."
The Supreme Court decision required him to admit the Missouri judg-
ment against the association as a claim.
The case is an interesting illustration of the workings of full
faith and credit. Had a judgment been recovered in Illinois against
the association after the appointment of the Illinois liquidator, it seems
that the judgment would not have been a provable claim in the Illinois
liquidation proceedings.6 Also, a judgment in Missouri against an
Illinois association in liquidation in Missouri would not be a provable
claim in Missouri liquidation proceedings. 2 And yet the judgment
56. See ILL. REv. STAT. C. 73, § 803 (1951).
57. People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 63 N.E.2d 479 (1945).
58. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 548, 549 (1947).
59. Id. at 548.
60. See IL. REv. STAT. c. 73, § 805 (1951).
61. See People ex rel. Jones v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 507, 508, 63 N.E.2d
479, 486, 487 (1945) ; see statement of Mr. Justice Douglas that "It is no more im-
portant that the suit on this underlying claim could not have been maintained in
Illinois after the liquidator had been appointed than the fact that a statute of limita-
tions of the State of the forum might have barred it." Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S.
545, 551 (1947). Compare this statement with the statement of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter that "Concededly, after the title to the Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds has
passed to the Illinois liquidator, it would not be open to a citizen of Illinois to ob-
tain in the courts of Illinois, so as to serve as a basis of a claim in Lloyds Illinois
assets, such a judgment as Morris, a citizen of Missouri, secured in the Missouri
courts." Id. at 557-558.
62. See McDonald v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S.W.2d 1157
(1939), cited in People v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 507, 63 N.E.2d 479, 487
(1945). And note the following statement by Mr. Justice Douglas: "And the
Missouri judgment may not be defeated by virtue of the fact that under other cir-
cumstances petitioner might not have been able to obtain it in Missouri or to have
received any benefit from it there, as, for example, if a liquidator had been ap-
pointed for the debtor in Missouri prior to judgment." Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S.
545, 551 (1947).
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recovered in Missouri after title to Illinois assets had vested in the
Illinois liquidator is held entitled to recognition as a claim against
assets of the association which, undoubtedly, Illinois alone had juris-
diction to administer in liquidation proceedings.
The decision has been criticized by eminent authority as an in-
stance of "full faith and credit out of hand." ' It is submitted, with
due deference, that the case is an instance where full faith and credit
compels recognition in Illinois of a Missouri judgment because of a
superior interest in Missouri. Morris, a resident of Missouri and a
Missouri agent for Chicago Lloyds, was, in Missouri, wrongly ar-
rested and maliciously prosecuted.64 May not the State of Missouri,
of all the states, have had a special governmental interest in deter-
mining whether and to what extent Morris should be granted repara-
tion against Chicago Lloyds? Missouri lacks power to administer in
liquidation the Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds. That power is in
the Illinois liquidator appointed by order of a competent court in
Illinois. Illinois has a special governmental interest in the liquidation
and administration of the assets in Illinois. Morris v. Jones, as finally
decided in the Supreme Court, requires Illinois to recognize the superior
interest of Missouri in determining or adjudicating that Morris had a
claim for compensation against Chicago Lloyds. The Supreme Court
assures implementation of the Missouri interest by holding that full
faith and credit requires Illinois to recognize the Missouri judgment
as a claim against Illinois assets.
In Morris v. Jones it is true that Chicago Lloyds was subject to
the judicial power of Missouri before the Illinois court entered the
decree for its liquidation. The Missouri judgment may have been a
judgment in personam against the association. 5 Under the law of
Illinois the association as some sort of entity may be said to have
continued after the entry of the decree for liquidation.6" The entity
63. Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 CoL L. REV.
883, 884 et seq. (1947).
64. See Petition in case of Morris v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 206424B,
on file with Clerk of the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Missouri.
65. Mr. Justice Douglas points out that "the Illinois Supreme Court did not hold
that the appointment of a liquidator for Chicago Lloyds operated as an abatement
of the suit" brought by Morris in Missouri. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550
(1947). Mr. Justice Frankfurter says: "We are concerned here solely with the
situation presented by a State's exercise of its power over the liquidation of the
assets of an insurance company of its own creation. . . . We must assume it to be
Illinois law that the power to pass upon claims against property of a defunct
Illinois insurance company is lodged in the liquidator and that such power is not to
be foreclosed by a judgment against the defunct concern after title passes to the
liquidator." Id. at 557.
66. As to this, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois is not clear. See
statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter that "What is relevant also is whether in such
liquidation proceedings Illinois can refuse to accept at face value a judgment against
an Illinois insurance company obtained after that company had ceased to exist, a
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was hardly a vigorously living organism. In our hypothetical case 3
it is true that D was not subjected in his life to the judicial power of
State X. In Morris v. Jones a Missouri judgment in personam against
Chicago Lloyds is given recognition as a claim against assets in
liquidation in Illinois.17  In our hypothetical case 3 State X cannot
give a judgment in personam against A that will ground a claim against
assets in administration in State F.
Nevertheless we contend that if in Morris v. Jones full faith and
credit requires the Missouri judgment to be recognized as a claim
against Illinois assets of Chicago Lloyds, full faith and credit should
require the State X judgment in our hypothetical case 3 to be recog-
nized as a claim against assets of D in State F. The Illinois liquidator
of Chicago Lloyds was an officer appointed by an Illinois court to
administer the assets in Illinois of a group of persons which had ob-
tained certain privileges under the law of Illinois. Missouri could not
have given a judgment against Chicago Lloyds which would alter the
legal relations of the Illinois liquidator with reference to the assets in
Illinois to which he had title."8 In case 3, A as administrator of D is
an official appointed in State F to liquidate and dispose of certain
assets of D, in whom as one of its residents State F had a particular
interest. Disposition on D's death of those assets, after payment of
claims, will be had according to the law of State F.69 The persons
entitled to take thereunder may or may not be State F residents.
Whether or not they are is immaterial. They should take in sub-
ordination to those who are adjudged in the courts of State F to have
claims for compensation against the assets of D because of wrongful
acts committed by D in his lifetime in State X-to claims of "creditors
of the estate," to use popular phraseology. On reasonable analogy
to Morris v. Jones the claims of such "creditors" could be grounded
on adjudications rendered by courts in a state that cannot itself ad-
minister the assets of D.
Up to the present it has been assumed that, in our hypothetical
case 3, A was served with process in State X. If the judgment against
judgment which the creditor would enforce against assets which passed to the State
before the judgment was obtained," Id. at 560 (emphasis added) ; and his statement
that "Whether recovery may be based on this judgment in Missouri, or in any other
State except Illinois, or even in Illinois should the assets go out of the State's
hands and return to a reanitmated Chicago Lloyds, are questions that do not now call
for consideration." Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
67. "In any event, the Missouri judgment is res judicata as to the nature and
amount of petitioner's claim as against all defenses which could have been raised."
Id. at 552.
68. "No one can obtain part of the assets or enforce a right to specific property
in the possession of the liquidation court except upon application to it." Id. at 549.
69. This is so as to such assets as are within the jurisdiction of State F to
administer.
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him in State X as D's personal representative is entitled in State F to
full faith and credit as a claim against D's assets, it would seem that
the State X judgment should be equally entitled to full faith and credit
in State F if A were brought before the State X court only by substi-
tuted service on some state official of State X.
Finally it beclouds the issue to say that A as administrator or
executor of D's estate under a State F appointment cannot be sued
outside the state of his appointment. Statements to that effect are
made over and over again. The theory that a personal representative
cannot be sued outside the state of his appointment rests largely, in
this country, on Vaughan v. Northup.70 In that case an administrator
appointed in Kentucky, the state in which his decedent died domiciled,
was sued in the District of Columbia by certain persons claiming as
next of kin, who sought to force distribution of a sum of money the
administrator had received from the federal government in satisfaction
of a claim of the decedent for services rendered in the Revolution. In
his opinion Mr. Justice Story does speak of "an established doctrine,
that an administrator, appointed in one state, cannot, in his official
capacity, sue for any debts due to his intestate in the courts of another
state; and that he is not liable to be sued in that capacity, in the Courts
of the latter, by any creditor, for any debts due there by his intestate." 71
It is undoubtedly this statement that has led courts and commentators
to cite the case as authority that an administrator appointed in one
state cannot be sued as such in the courts of a sister state.72
Due attention has not, perhaps, been given to the fact that in the
course of his opinion Mr. Justice Story makes it plain that the decision
was rendered in the light of consideration of the interests of the federal
government. The complainants had urged that, because the Kentucky
administrator had received payment from the treasury at Washington,
such payment constituted assets of the deceased within the District of
Columbia, and the Kentucky administrator was to be held to account
for them in the District. To this Mr. Justice Story replied that as a
debtor the United States was not to be regarded as domiciled in the
70. 15 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1841).
71. Id. at 6.
72. E.g., Lewis v. Parrish, 115 Fed. 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1902) ; Bowles v. R. G. Dun-
Bradstreet Corp., 25 Del. Ch. 32, 45, 12 A.2d 392, 398 (1940) ; Burton v. Williams,
63 Neb. 431, 434-435, 88 N.W. 765, 766-767 (1902); GooDICcH, CONFLICr OF LAws
562 (3d ed. 1949); STUMBERG, CONFLIcr oF LAws 445 (2d ed. 1951). However,
certain exceptions to the general rule have long been recognized, particularly the
exception that allows equitable relief against a defaulting foreign personal representa-
tive; so even before Vaughan v. Northap, mupra note 70, a New York court held
that it could require an accounting of an Irish administrator who had brought assets
of his intestate into New York and there misapplied the same. McNamara v. Dwyer,
7 Paige Ch. 239 (N.Y. 1838). And see Falke v. Terry, 32 Colo. 85, 75 Pac. 425
(1903).
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District so that debts due from the United States to a decedent would
be assets for administration only in the District. On the contrary, the
interests of the federal government were deemed to require that the
United States be permitted to pay to the domiciliary (Kentucky)
administrator a debt due the deceased. Said the Justice:
". .. the administrator of a creditor of the government, duly
appointed in the state where he was domiciled at his death, has
full authority to receive payment, and give a full discharge of the
debt due to his intestate, in any place where the government may
choose to pay it; whether it be at the seat of the government, or
at any other place where the public funds are deposited. If any
other doctrine were to be recognized, the consequence would be,
that before the personal representative of any deceased creditor,
belonging to any State in the Union, would be entitled to receive
payment of any debt due by the government, he would be com-
pellable to take out letters of administration in this District for
the due administration of such assets. Such a doctrine has never
yet been sanctioned by any practice of the government; and would
be full of public as well as private inconvenience." (emphasis
added) ."3
If the domiciliary administrator were the proper person to receive
payment, and if personalty of the deceased intestate were to be dis-
tributed in accord with the statute of distributions of Kentucky as the
state of the latter's last domicile, considerations of convenience and
expediency might well be held to require that suit by next of kin to
compel distribution be brought in the state of such domicile. Such
was the conclusion of the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Story referred to a statute of Congress that permitted
an administrator appointed outside the District of Columbia to sue in
the District on a claim alleged to be due the deceased. 74 The failure
of the statute to provide that such a foreign administrator should be
subject to suit in the District was regarded as equivalent to a declara-
tion that he was not, but there is not a word to the effect that Congress
could not have so provided. There was no reason why the Court in
Vaughan v. Northup should have expressed an opinion on the power
of Congress so to provide. All that is contended is that there is no
support for the proposition that the Court in the case committed itself
to holding that Congress could not so enact.
In fact, under its power to establish inferior federal courts Con-
gress may provide that administrators and executors be subject to suit
in federal courts in states other than the states of their appointment. 5
73. Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 6-7 (U.S. 1841).
74. 2 STAT. 758 (1812).
75. United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878).
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It may be that this power must be exercised so as not unreasonably
to interfere with the administration and settlement of estates of dece-
dents in the state probate courts.7" In 1921, a federal statute was passed
which permitted in any suit in the federal courts the revival of action
against "executors and administrators of any party, who dies before
final judgment or decree, appointed under the laws of any State or Ter-
ritory of the United States. . . ." 7 Under this statute a federal dis-
trict court in Wisconsin revived a suit against the Missouri adminis-
trator of Hermann, a deceased Missourian, even though the outcome
of the suit might have led to the imposition of a constructive trust on
assets in the hands of the Missouri administrator-assets for which
he would otherwise have accounted to the Missouri court of probate."5
Whether or not an action may be revived against the personal
representative of a defendant who dies pending suit has been described
as a "procedural" question, one to be settled by the statutory or other
law of the state in which the action is pending, without reference to the
law of the state in which the cause of action arose.7 ' Generally the
personal representative against whom revival is sought is one appointed
and qualified in the state in which the action is pending. For example,
D (a domiciliary of State Y) by his negligent acts committed in State
X physically injures P in State X; P sues D in State Y, and D dies
pending the action. Whether or not revival is to be allowed against
A, appointed as D's administrator in State Y, is to be settled, it has
been said, in accord with the "local" law of State Y, without reference
to the law of State X." Suppose that action is pending against D in
State X at the time of his death and he died domiciled in State Y,
leaving no assets or estate for administration in State X. To date,
what authority there is in the state courts seems to militate against
allowing revival against the administrator or executor appointed in
State Y.s'
76. Cf. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 486 (1947).
77. 42 STAT. 352, 353 (1922), amending REv. STAT. § 955 (1875); 28 U.S.C.
§ 778 (1928). The statutory provision has been superseded by Rule 25 of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
78. Luster v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 637
(1932). It should be noted that a United States District Court in Wisconsin had
enjoined Hermann and his agents from disposing of certain assets and that the
Circuit Court of Appeals said: "The executors succeeded to the estate of the deceased
Hermann. That estate was subject to certain liens, among them being the burden
of the trust in favor of the stockholders." Id. at 541 (1932). But see comments on
the case in Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Jasspon, 92 F. Supp. 20, 23-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also Plimpton v. Mattakeunk Cabin Colony, 6 F. Supp. 72
(D. Conn. 1934).
79. See statements in Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 AtI. 691, 692 (1928).
80. Ibid.
81. See discussion in Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
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Whether the action can be revived against A as a State Y ad-
ministrator or executor really raises the same question of power in
State X as does the question whether A as a State Y administrator
could have been sued in State X as the original party defendant.
Nothing is gained by terming "survivorship" a matter of "substance"
and "revival" a matter of "procedure" or "remedy." In both cases the
question is whether State X can exert judicial power over A as an
administrator appointed and qualified in State Y.
Congress may provide for actions against personal representatives
in federal courts outside of the states of their appointments. Also, an
administrator or executor may find himself substituted as a party
defendant in some action pending in a federal court outside the state
of his appointment. It does not necessarily follow that a personal
representative may be subject to suit against his will and without his
consent in the court of a state outside the state of his appointment.
The situation in the federal courts, however, has a certain persuasive
force as to what should be allowed in the state courts. The Constitu-
tion envisages at least the possibility of an efficient system of federal
courts which will render uniform justice throughout the United States.
The Constitution also contemplates a system of courts in the states
manned by judicial officers appointed under state law and operating
under procedures prescribed by the states, subject to certain restric-
tions imposed by the Constitution-those of due process and others.
The Constitution contemplates that each state in its administration of
justice shall bear in mind that it is one of a sisterhood of forty-eight
states, each charged with the task of making its state-administered
system of justice effectively operative within the frame of a federal
union, with due regard to the claims and interests of the sister states.
This on occasion may require a state to give effect within its own
borders to the statutory policy of a sister state. On occasion, when
a state does not choose to do so, the Supreme Court under the full
faith and credit clause may require it to subordinate its peculiarly local
interests to the superior interests of a sister state. It is submitted
that a statute providing for the exercise of judicial power over the
personal representative of a deceased non-resident motorist is an in-
stance when full faith and credit should so operate.
